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We propose a new scheme for quantum key distribution using macroscopic non-classical pulses
of light having of the order 106 photons per pulse. Sub-shot-noise quantum correlation between
the two polarization modes in a pulse gives the necessary sensitivity to eavesdropping that ensures
the security of the protocol. We consider pulses of two-mode squeezed light generated by a type-II
seeded parametric amplification process. We analyze the security of the system in terms of the effect
of an eavesdropper on the bit error rates for the legitimate parties in the key distribution system.
We also consider the effects of imperfect detectors and lossy channels on the security of the scheme.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd , 03.67.Hk, 42.50.Dv, 42.50.Lc
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is used for sending
a key from one party (Alice) to another (Bob) in such a
manner that the laws of quantum mechanics guarantee
the security of the key [1]. The key can be used later as
a one-time pad to encrypt a message. If an eavesdropper
(Eve) intercepts all or part of the key, errors in the key
are unavoidably introduced, which are detectable by Bob
and Alice, thus revealing the presence of eavesdropping.
All experimentally demonstrated schemes to date have
used single photons to encode the key bits [2]. Such
systems are subject to several difficulties - foremost is
the absence of reliable technologies for generating single-
photon pulses on demand. Usually, highly attenuated
laser pulses are used to approximate single-photon pulses,
but the presence of the two-photon component in such
pulses provides a potential avenue for an eavesdropper to
foil the security by acquiring the redundant photon and
making measurements on it. Other difficulties include
sensitivity to stray light and the difficulty of low-noise
detection of single photons at wavelengths (1.3 - 1.5 µm)
that are used in fiber-optic telecommunication.
We present a scheme for QKD that uses macroscopic,
non-classical light pulses. Our light pulses are macro-
scopic in that each contains on average 104−106 photons,
and are “non-classical” in that their density operator can-
not be represented as a statistical (diagonal) mixture of
coherent states. The variable that we use for the encod-
ing of each bit is the difference of the numbers of photons
in two optical modes.
Other proposed schemes for QKD using multi-photon
non-classical optical fields exist [3, 4, 5]. These schemes
are distinct from ours in that they are based on the mea-
surement of field quadratures in squeezed states. These
schemes require one or more local oscillators, that are
phase locked to the signal field, for the measurement of
the signal field, thereby introducing a practical difficulty
in the implementation. Schemes based on polarization
require not phase stability, but polarization axis stabil-
ity.
There exists a proposal to use macroscopic optical
pulses prepared in a coherent state, to perform QKD[6].
This scheme uses the inherent quantum uncertainty for
the number of photons in the coherent state to ensure se-
curity. However the intended recipient of the key is also
subject to the same uncertainties in photon number as
the eavesdropper. This results in a large systematic error
rate (≥ 30%) for the measurement of the bits. The large
error rate is corrected by using considerable amounts of
classical error correction, requiring a large number of op-
tical pulses to be sent for each logical key bit. This results
in a very low logical-bit-per-optical-pulse rate.
In this paper we will describe how our scheme over-
comes some of the difficulties with practical implemen-
tations for previously proposed QKD schemes. We also
provide a strong plausibility argument for the security of
our scheme.
It should be noted that this paper does not contain
a proof of absolute security, as has been proven for the
BB84 protocol [7] and the quadrature squeezed-state pro-
tocol [5]. The first proof of security for BB84 [7] did not
take into account several practical points. Subsequently,
several proofs have been constructed which take into ac-
count some important practical considerations which af-
fect the security of QKD protocols such as lossy channels,
imperfect detectors and imperfect sources [8, 9, 10, 11].
Proof of absolute security is a difficult task, and work
is currently underway to construct a rigorous proof of
absolute security at non-zero data rates for our QKD
protocol.
In our protocol the security of the key is ensured by
using non-classical light pulses having, in a particular
polarization basis, a photon difference number between
two polarization modes that is better defined than in a
coherent-state with the same total number of photons.
The quantum correlations between the orthogonal po-
larization modes are rapidly degraded by any of Eve’s
attempts to measure the key. The degradation of the cor-
relations leads to different measurement results for Bob
than in the eavesdropper-free case. The changes in the
measurement result will then indicate to Bob and Alice
the presence of Eve.
The protocol is as follows: Alice encodes each bit
value in the mean “polarization difference number” 〈n〉 =
〈n1 − n2〉 , where 〈n1〉(〈n2〉) is the mean number of pho-
2tons in the first (second) polarization mode making up
a basis. Two different polarization bases are used. One
basis (“V/H basis”) is defined by the vertical and hori-
zontal linear polarizations; then n = nV −nH . The other
basis (“±45 basis”) is defined by the +45 degree linear
polarization and the -45 degree linear polarization; then
n = n+45−n−45. Alice chooses at random which basis to
use. Bob measures the photon difference number either
in the V/H basis or in the ±45 basis. After the trans-
mission of all the key bits, Alice and Bob communicate
via a public channel and compare which basis was used
on each encoding/measurement. Alice and Bob will keep
only the bits for which they used the same basis for the
respective pulse. To estimate the overall error rate, Bob
and Alice compare a small fraction of the key bits over
the public channel.
We consider non-classical optical pulses used for the
encoding generated using a type-II seeded parametric
amplification process [12, 13, 14]. The amplifier consists
of a type-II non-linear optical crystal which is pumped
by a vertically polarized optical pulse at frequency 2ω.
The crystal is simultaneously seeded with a transform-
limited optical pulse at frequency ω. Each polarization
mode of the seed pulse is in an independent coherent
state, with a mean number of photons 〈nV 〉 in the ver-
tical polarization mode and a mean number 〈nH〉 in the
horizontal polarization mode. Both the vertical and hor-
izontal polarization modes at ω experience amplification.
The overall amplification can be characterized byG(> 1),
which is the factor by which the total mean photon num-
ber NT = 〈nV +nH〉 increases. G values of up to 20 have
been experimentally measured [14]. The mean photon
difference number 〈n〉 = 〈nV − nH〉 of the seed pulse is
small (≤ 1%) compared to 〈nV 〉 and 〈nH〉.
Quantum correlations between the vertical and hori-
zontal polarization modes are generated by the amplifier,
which result in the statistical properties (including the
mean and the variance) of the photon difference num-
ber n to remain unchanged by amplification. This fol-
lows from the fact that n is a conserved quantity un-
der the action of the nondegenerate two-mode squeezing
(parametric amplification) Hamiltonian, which produces
a non-classical state of light.[15]
For coherent-state seed pulses, the variance of n equals
the total mean number of photons in the seed pulse,
var(n)seed = 〈nV + nH〉seed. The variance of n for the
amplified pulse is the same as the variance of n for the
seed pulse, therefore,
var(n)amp = 〈nV + nH〉seed = 1
G
NT,amp (1)
The variance of n after the parametric amplification is
thus considerably smaller than the variance that would
be present if the amplified pulse were in a coherent state
having the same NT as in the amplified pulse. For
the coherent-state case, the variance would be given by
the total number of photons, var(n)coherent = 〈nV +
nH〉amp = NT,amp. This coherent-state variance is re-
ferred to as the shot-noise level (SNL). Thus the vari-
ance of n for the time-integrated amplified pulse will be
below the SNL by a factor of G compared to a coherent-
state pulse with the same number of photons [14, 15].
The extent to which the variance of n is below the SNL,
tells us how strong the quantum correlations between the
photons in the vertical and horizontal polarization modes
are.
The phase difference between the vertical and horizon-
tal polarization modes is π/2, giving a polarization state
that is very nearly circular, with a slight degree of ellip-
ticity determined by 〈n〉. The major axis of the polariza-
tion ellipse is oriented vertically in the case where 〈n〉 > 0
and oriented horizontally in the case where 〈n〉 < 0. Al-
ice can switching the bit value by performing a 90 degree
rotation of the slightly elliptical polarization state.
Following the parametric amplifier is a 45 degree po-
larization rotator. Alice can use this to rotate the po-
larization by 45 degrees before sending the pulse to Bob.
This will have the effect of changing the V/H basis into
the ±45 basis. This polarization rotation is applied or
not at random. Alice records which basis (V/H or ±45)
was used for each pulse. For those pulses that have their
polarization basis rotated, the bit encoding changes. The
relevant mean photon difference number 〈n〉 is now writ-
ten as 〈n〉 = 〈n+45−n−45〉. We will refer to the basis that
is set by Alice’s rotator on a given pulse as the “correct”
basis and the other basis as the “incorrect” basis.
Bob receives the optical pulses sent by Alice. Bob mea-
sures n in either the V/H basis or in the ±45 basis at
random. Bob uses a 45 degree polarization rotator and
a polarizing beam splitter to select a basis and separate
the polarization modes. He counts the number of pho-
tons in each of the polarization modes for a given basis
(within precision set by detector noise), and subtracts
the number of photons in each mode to determine n.
Alice encodes a logical “1” (“0”) key bit by setting the
mean value of the difference number to be in the cor-
rect basis 〈n〉 = +N (〈n〉 = −N), where N is a positive
number comparable to SqrtNT,amp, the SNL for the total
field.
The action of the basis change on the two-mode
photon-correlated state produced by the OPA results in
two independent single mode quadrature squeezed states
in the polarization modes of the incorrect basis. There
are no correlations between these quadrature squeezed
states. Therefore, 〈n〉 = 0, regardless of the bit value,
and the variance of n in the incorrect basis is thus the
variance of NT,amp, which can easily be calculated from
equations 3. This variance is always greater thanNT,amp.
There is thus greater uncertainty for a measurement of
n in the incorrect basis than in a coherent state with
NT,amp photons.
By setting, in the correct basis, |〈n〉| = N << NT,amp,
a single measurement of n, regardless of whether the mea-
surement was made in the correct or incorrect basis, will
result in a numerical value within the same range. This
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FIG. 1: Probability distributions for measurement of n in the
correct basis for a logical 1 (solid curve), logical 0 (dotted
curve), and for measurement in the incorrect basis (dashed
curve) for (a) no loss and (b) for 50% loss
can easily be seen from the distributions for measure-
ments of n shown in Figure 1. This makes it difficult
to determine from a single measurement which basis is
correct and which is incorrect.
Bob decodes a measurement yielding n > 0 as a logical
“1”, and n < 0 as a logical “0”. Bob does not know a
priori which basis Alice used to encode each key bit. In
the incorrect basis, the probability distribution P (n) for
the photon difference number n is the same regardless
of the bit value Alice sent. There is thus no key bit
information contained in the results of a measurement
in the incorrect basis. To eliminate the results of such
measurements, after the transmission of all the bits, Bob
and Alice communicate publicly to determine on which
pulses Bob was using the correct basis. The bits are kept
only for those pulses for which Bob was measuring in the
correct basis.
Bob does not need to use an “ideal” detector to mea-
sure the number of photons in each of the polarization
modes. Due to the finite width of the initial Poisson dis-
tribution for the photon number in the coherent seed, it
is not necessary to use a detector that can distinguish
between m and m ± 1 photons. In practice a detector
with a noise-equivalent photon number around 200-300
is sufficient. This allows the use of standard linear photo-
diodes with quantum efficiencies approaching 100% [14].
Even non-unity quantum efficiency detectors are accept-
able, with deviation from unity efficiency simply treated
as a loss, which will be discussed below.
Using nˆ = nˆV − nˆH = aˆ†V aˆV − aˆ†H aˆH , where the aˆ’s are
boson annihilation operators, we calculate the moments
of n by writing the amplified annihilation operators in
terms of the seed annihilation operators and assuming
coherent-state seed pulses. The annihilation operators
for the amplified pulses when they reach Bob, including
any losses experienced by the pulse during the propaga-
tion, are given by the two-mode squeezing transforma-
tion combined with a non-polarizing linear beamsplitter
transformation to account for the losses[14]
aˆV (a) =
√
1− η
(
µaˆV (s) + nuaˆ
†
H(s)
)
+ i
√
η bˆV (2)
aˆH(a) =
√
1− η
(
µaˆH(s) + νaˆ
†
V (s)
)
+ i
√
η bˆH , (3)
where the (a) subscripts refer to the amplified pulse, the
(s) subscripts to the seed pulse, and η is the loss experi-
enced by the pulse during propagation. The loss param-
eter η includes loss due to a lossy transmission channel
and loss due to partial sampling of the beam by an eaves-
dropper. The bˆ’s are the boson operators for the vertical
and horizontal vacuum modes associated with the losses,
and µ and ν are complex non-linear coefficients obeying
|µ|2 − |ν|2 = 1, which are functions of the properties of
the non-linear crystal and the pump beam.
By calculating the appropriate moments of nˆ, we can
get the probability distributions for n. Shown in Fig.
1(a) are the unnormalized probability distributions for
Bob’s measurement of n in the correct basis with a sent
logical 1 key bit (solid curve), with a logical 0 key bit
(dotted curve), and for a measurement in the incorrect
basis (this distribution is the same for both logical 1 and
0 key bits) (dashed curve). For Fig. 1(a), in the case of
100% transmission efficiency, the following realistic nu-
merical values were used: ±N = ±2460, µ = 1.7, and
ν = 2.36eipi/2, leading to G = 10 and NT = 2× 106 after
the amplification. These parameters lead to a variance
of n in the correct basis that is 10 times smaller than the
SNL, when there is no loss (i.e. η = 0).
The distributions plotted in Fig. 1 for measurements
made in the correct basis are Gaussian approximations of
the Poisson distributions for n, with means and widths
determined by the calculated means and variances of n.
The Poisson distributions are very well approximated (to
better than 10−5) by Gaussian distributions for pulses
with photon numbers > 104.
The distributions plotted in Fig. 1 for measurements
made in the incorrect basis are Gaussian approxima-
tions of the exact distribution. In the wrong basis,
each polarization mode is in an independent single-mode
quadrature-squeezed state. The photon number distribu-
tion for each single-mode squeezed state can in our limit
of large photon number be well approximated by a Gaus-
sian distribution [16]. The difference of two independent
Gaussian variables will thus also be Gaussian.
Due to the tails of the distributions for the two bit val-
ues, there is a non-zero probability that a pulse encoded
by Alice as a logical 1(0) would be measured as a logical
0(1). Such an error is a “bit-flip error” (i.e. 1⇀↽ 0). Us-
ing the same numerical values for the system parameters,
the error rate in the absence of loss or an eavesdropper
is 10−8.
One of the effects of losses or an eavesdropper is to
increase Bob’s error rate in a noticeable way. The change
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FIG. 2: Bob’s and Alice’s error rate PERR versus loss η.
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FIG. 3: Eve’s probability Pη to infer the correct bit value
given sampling fraction of η, versus η, assuming she correctly
guesses the basis.
in the error rate due to the eavesdropper depends on the
particular type of attack and the extent of the attack.
It should be noted that there exist situations (such as
the “superior-channel attack” discussed below) where the
eavesdropper can take advantage of large losses to acquire
key information.
Any transmission loss experienced by the pulse will
increase the error rates even in the absence of an eaves-
dropper. Bob and Alice can determine their systematic
error rate by characterizing the loss of the transmission
medium using classical means before the QKD system is
installed. Shown in Fig. 2 is a log plot of Bob’s (and
Alice’s) error rate versus the loss η. Any increases from
their new systematic error rate will be indicative of the
presence of an eavesdropper.
We will analyze four different attacks by Eve on the
QKD system. In the first attack, Eve captures the en-
tire optical pulse sent by Alice, makes a measurement
in a randomly chosen basis, and records the inferred bit
value. She then attempts to prepare the same state that
Alice sent, and sends the prepared state on to Bob. Eve
does not know which basis was used to encode the bit,
and in the cases where she measures n in the incorrect
basis (50% of the pulses), she will get the wrong bit value
50% of the time. Eve’s errors will result in Alice and Bob
having a 25% bit-flip error rate, which is a clear indica-
tion of eavesdropping.
In the second attack, Eve simply samples a fraction
of the pulse with a non-polarizing beam splitter and lets
the remainder continue on to Bob. Eve can then do any
sort of measurement on the sampled portion and try to
determine some information about the key bit. Any at-
tempts by Eve to sample part of the beam will result in
a loss η. As discussed earlier, and as can be seen from
the plot in Figure 2, there is an increase in the error rate
as η increases from 0. Based on their error rate, Bob
and Alice can make a good estimate for an upper bound
on the amount of information that Eve would be able to
obtain by sampling with a beam splitter.
In the third attack, Eve captures the entire optical
pulse sent by Alice, passes it through a non-polarizing
50/50 beamsplitter and measures the photon difference
number simultaneously in both bases (V/H and ±45).
Based on the results of this measurement, Eve prepares
the state she believes Alice sent, and sends that state
to Bob. The probability distributions for the difference
number n that Eve would measure in this case are shown
in Fig. 1(b). Given the considerable overlap between
the three possible distributions, Eve does not gain much
information from the results of a single measurement on
both bases about which basis was used to encode the bit.
Figure 3 shows Eve’s probability of inferring the cor-
rect bit value as a function of η for sampling a fraction
of the pulse with a non-polarizing beam-splitter. This
plot assumes that Eve knows which basis is being used,
which will in general not be true, further reducing her
knowledge of the key. In the case of simultaneous mea-
surements, Eve measures at 50% sampling. From Fig.
3, Eve will have approximately a 95% probability of get-
ting the bit value correct for the correct basis, but she
has only approximately a 50% probability of getting the
basis correct. Therefore she has only a 50% probability of
getting the correct bit value and basis. She will thus pre-
pare states which result in incorrect bit values for Bob.
These errors will be detected during Bob’s and Alice’s
error rate checking, once again giving a clear indication
of the eavesdropping.
The fourth attack is a “superior channel attack”. It re-
quires that Eve possess the following technical items: a
quantum memory system which can store quantum states
for a potentially long period of time and a transmission
channel which is lossless. The attack consists of Eve split-
ting the optical pulse into two equal parts using a 50/50
beamsplitter, sending one half of the pulse to Bob, and
keeping the other half of the pulse. The pulse that she
sends to Bob is sent on Eve’s lossless transmission chan-
nel which she has substituted for the original lossy chan-
nel. Eve stores the states of all the optical pulses sent
from Alice to Bob with her quantum memory system.
Eve then waits until after the public discussion which re-
veals the measurement bases, and she then measures her
stored pulses in the correct bases.
In the case that the transmission loss from Alice to
Bob (before Eve replaces the channel with her lossless
channel) was 50%, Bob and Eve will receive the same
5information. Both Eve and Bob will have received the
same optical pulse which has experienced a 50% loss.
Any one-way error correction which is sent by Alice will
help correct Eve’s errors just as well as it corrects Bob’s
errors. In the event that the original transmission loss is
greater than 50%, Eve will be able to obtain even more
key information than Bob.
Such an attack could be avoided by limiting the use of
the protocol to channels with less than 50% loss. Also,
if the error correction or privacy amplification required
two-way communication between the recipient of the key,
Eve would not necessarily be able to correct her errors
without revealing her identity.
It is possible to generate type-II parametrically am-
plified pulses as described in this paper using conven-
tional lasers and non-linear crystals. It is possible to
make direct photodetection measurements of the signal
pulses with the necessary sensitivity[14]. This differs
with the QKD schemes using quadrature-squeezed states
which require homodyne detection. Our scheme also has
a low systematic bit error rate, unlike the coherent-state
key distribution system[6], which requires considerable
redundancy to overcome intrinsic uncertainties that are
unavoidable for the intended recipient of the key.
The physical origin of the security for our QKD scheme
lies in the behavior of non-classical quantum fields when
subject to beam-splitting losses or to polarization-basis
changes. The plausibility of the security is based on
the fact that Eve’s attacks will consist of combinations
of beam-splitting and polarization basis changes. Other
more general attacks need to be considered further.
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